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I. General overview 
 
Belgium currently has a legal system which is still, to a large extent, French due to the 
annexation by France in 1795 and the subsequent introduction of French revolutionary law 
and the codes of Napoleon. Thus, in many ways, 1795 marks a watershed, a sudden legal 
transplant displacing the old law. However, this should not be exaggerated, as already before 
1795, French law had been seeping through, so it did not start a new trend, but confirmed, 
albeit rather abruptly, an existing one. 
 
A. Pre 1795 law in the Southern Netherlands 
 
Belgium only became independent in 1830, but it was not a completely new entity. 
When Charlemagne’s great empire broke up, France and Germany arose from the ashes 
and among these a patchwork of principalities could be found, the most important of them 
being in the South, Flanders, Brabant, Hainaut, Namur, Liège and Luxemburg and in the 
North, Holland, Utrecht, and Guelders. From the end of the fourteenth century, French 
princes, the Dukes of Burgundy, started the unification of these so-called Low Countries, a 
process which was completed by their Habsburg successors in the sixteenth century (two 
ecclesiastical principalities, Liège and Stavelot-Malmédy managed to retain their 
independence), only a few decades before a revolt against the Spanish Habsburgs led to a 
separation. The North, the United Provinces, achieved independence and became also 
known under the name The Netherlands in the vernacular of the Low Countries, whereas the 
South remained Spanish and took the Latin name for the Low Countries, Belgium. An 
experiment of independence with Spanish and Austrian blessing proved to be short-lived and 
the Southern Low Countries were to remain Habsburg until the French annexation in 1795, 
though they passed from the Spanish to the Austrian branch in the early eighteenth century. 
 Although this political background is needed to understand the legal history of Ancien 
Régime Belgium, its impact in the field of law was limited. Neither the Burgundians, nor their 
Habsburg successors managed to impose legal unity.1 During the High Middle Ages law 
essentially was a local and regional phenomenon and it remained so, as unification had to 
wait for the French Revolution. Yet, over the centuries, local customary law had changed due 
to its flexibility. Originally, local customary law may have been just that; local and customary 
in origin. Later on, however, it came to mean ‘accepted as custom by the local population’, or 
at least its leading lawyers. Thus, an openess for foreign elements paved the way for legal 
transplants,2 because lawyers cared more about getting results than about the purity of their 
customary law. 
 
1. The High Middle Ages: the monopoly of local, customary law 
 
 During the High Middle Ages local customary law reigned supreme and the 
renaissance of Roman law in the Mediterranean did not affect this state of affairs for a long 
time. The best indications of this are the so-called renunciations of Roman law, by which a 
party gave up the rights Roman law awarded. The earliest appear in the mid thirteenth 
century and only in charters by clerics, whereas for their appearance in lay charters we have 
to wait until the end of that century. Moreover, Roman law is only mentioned because it is to 
be rejected.3 Nevertheless, the renunciations are a first step towards legal acculturation, as 
people became aware that there was another important body of law which could no longer be 
ignored. The agents of this change were churchmen, but accounts of the reception of learned 
law tend to underplay the fact that it was composed of two elements, Roman and Romano-
canonical law, and that the latter already took hold in the thirteenth century with the 
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officialities, bishop’s courts with a university trained judge,4 and even some influences on 
legal practice, like the reappearance of the testament.5  
  With this exception, the supremacy of indigenous law was uncontested. Yet, legal 
transplants and legal assimilation took place, though on a smaller scale. The Southern Low 
Countries had hundreds of customary legal systems and, nevertheless, some clusters of 
customs can be found. Unfortunately, they may vary depending upon the legal rule one 
studies and no final explanation can yet be given for how they came to be.6 A few 
mechanisms can be indicated. For example, a prince could grant a privilege to a city and 
award it the law of another more developed place. For example, in Brabant the duke gave his 
newly founded city of ‘s Hertogenbosch (the Dutch name, the duke’s forest, indicating its 
infancy at the time) the law of Leuven and from there it would spread all over the Northern 
Low Countries.7 In cases like these, it was common for the court of the ‘daughter-city’ to ask 
the advice of its mother, its head, but other lesser courts did this too. At first, this was a loose 
affair, courts being free to chose their head, but by the early thirteenth century this had 
become more organised and the lower courts had turned into subordinate courts, which had 
to follow their head’s opinion.8 A third mechanism of unification were the legal experts of the 
customary law courts, its presidents, bailiffs, spokesmen (the spokesman was the person 
who by answering the president’s questions formulated the decision of the court) and so on, 
who were most of the time active in more than one court.9 All these mechanisms appeared in 
a haphazard way, driven by circumstances, not by any great design. Consequently, it could 
also, though exceptionally, happen that a customary legal system fragmented. Thus, in the 
county of Flanders the once unitary feudal law fell apart at the end of the thirteenth century.10 
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 2. The late middle ages: indigenous law meets Rome by way of France and is not impressed 
 
 From the last decades of the thirteenth century specialists of customary law started to 
write down their law, but, at first, these texts show no traces of Roman law. One can, of 
course, remark that the idea of writing down law is in itself stimulated by the influence of 
learned law and its lawyers,11 but that would be giving too much credit to these earliest 
‘documents’. In their original form they consisted of notes taken in court on slips of 
parchment and kept together in a bag.12 As such, they reflect the spread of writing, not of 
learned law. They are too clumsy to be more than that. However, out of these humble origins 
arose in the fourteenth century more elaborate texts and those were indeed inspired by the 
example of Roman law.13 It is also in this century that books of learned law become more 
numerous in libraries.14 
 The factors which contributed to the rise of Roman law were diverse. Its first carriers 
were the already mentioned officialities and their judges, but the real breakthrough was due 
to other university trained lawyers, the legists. From the fourteenth century onwards, 
hundreds of them appear in the Southern Netherlands and they infiltrate from the top down. 
They first appeared in the newly established central courts, the councils of justice.15 Lower 
courts were not staffed by university trained lawyers, but the major cities hired them to advise 
these courts.16 Notaries public contributed less to the diffusion of Roman law. The first were 
Italians appearing at the end of the thirteenth century, but there was not a real need for them, 
given that parties preferred to go to a court of customary law (composed of vassals or 
aldermen) to have it record their agreements.17  
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 As this shows, even in the late middle ages, the impact of Roman law remained 
limited. Actual legal transplants of substantive law, like the doctrine of laesio enormis, are 
rare.18 Moreover, these Roman law rules served to plug the gaps in customary law and to 
strengthen its existing principles.19 For that however, learned law had to compete with other 
mechanisms. A court could ask its head’s advice or it could have a point of law established 
by an ‘inquest by turba’ (an inquiry amongst the local senior specialists of law).20 Roman law, 
however, influenced, certainly in the highest courts, the procedure21 and, more in general, the 
mental framework of the university trained lawyers at the top. For the rank and file, not that 
much changed. For example, there was no romanization of legal terminology until the end of 
the fifteenth century.22 In short, legal transplants were exceptional and even legal 
acculturation remained limited. 
 In fact, the focus on the influence of Roman law obscures the role of France. True, 
the most influential learned author was Bartolus, an Italian,23 but the real guide seems to 
have been France. In a larger context the Southern Low Countries were together with 
Northern France, the so-called lands of customary law, the pays de droit coutumier and 
many new elements were copied from French law, like, for example, the inquest by turba.24 
Even for Roman law, the Southern Low Countries followed the lead of France, with the 
county of Flanders serving as a gateway for French ideas. Unlike the other principalities 
which belonged to the Empire, Flanders was a French fief (only a small part, Imperial 
Flanders was held from the emperor).25 Thus, as soon as his overlord, the French king, 
started to use Roman law, the count of Flanders had to also, if only to fight fire with fire. 
Consequently, the first legists and notaries to appear in the Low Countries worked for the 
Count Guy of Flanders who hired them specifically to counter the French king. For the 
notaries public this is well-known, as they authenticated the appeals of Guy against his 
excommunication at the order of Philip IV of France and these documents are referred to in 
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any history of the medieval county of Flanders.26 The case of the legists is more complicated, 
because the pioneering study by Gilissen27 wrongly interpreted the sources. According to 
Gilissen, Count Guy had from 1279 on legists serving on his council and these were all 
foreigners. However, none of them ever worked in Flanders itself. Most of them were active 
in Paris where they defended the count’s interests before the Parlement de Paris.28 Only one 
generation later, under Guy’s son Robert, we find legists on the count’s council in Flanders.29 
Flanders reacted to France when it turned to Roman law and once Flanders did so, the other 
principalities eventually followed. Many examples can be given, but the best is, once again, 
the law of procedure before the highest court. Flanders imitated the Parlement de Paris and 
influenced in its turn the other principalities. However, it is remarkable, once again, that 
changes in substantive law remained exceptional, even though appeal was possible in Paris 
against Flemish judgements.30 
 As well as French royal institutions, the University of Orleans was another 
intermediary for bringing Roman law to the Netherlands, as it was the most popular university 
for students from the Southern Low Countries in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The 
lure of Orleans continued even after the founding of a university in Leuven (in the duchy of 
Brabant) in 1425,31 as many students from the Low Countries saw studies in Leuven as a 
prelude to a diploma from the more prestigious University of Orleans.32 
 
3. The early modern era: selective reception of Roman law and the French example 
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 In the second half of the fifteenth century and even more so in the first half of the 
sixteenth Roman law made an enormous advance,33 but once again the main impetus was 
French. For example, the first author to use Roman law extensively was William van der 
Tanerijen in 1474-1476.34 However, his work, although it claims to describe the practice of 
the Council of Brabant, was too romanized to be useful to practitioners and, therefore, it 
never became popular at the time. Moreover, van der Tanerijen took his inspiration from a 
French book, the late fourteenth century Somme rural of Jean Boutillier.35 Even though 
Boutillier wrote on customary law, he used the terminology of Roman law a lot and referred 
to it. As he dealt with the law of nearby Northern France, his book was also extremely 
popular in the Southern Netherlands. It was printed many times in the original French and in 
the Dutch translation, both languages more accessible to ordinary practitioners than Latin. 
Through Boutillier, the practitioners in the Southern Netherlands came into contact with the 
legal grammar of the learned law and they started to adjust their own terminology.36 In that 
aspect, his work was continued by a local author, Philippe Wielant, in the first years of the 
sixteenth century. Wielant brought the strengths of Roman law to the study of customary 
law.37 The resulting blend achieved great popularity at home and also European acclaim 
thanks to a Latin translation by Joos de Damhouder (who presented it as his own original 
work).38 The work of these authors and their successors was a mixed blessing for the 
influence of Roman law. On the one hand it ensured the progress of Roman law, on the other 
it also made further romanization less necessary. 
 This was even more true of another French idea, the homologation of customary law, 
i.e. its official compilation and subsequent promulgation by decree.39 The Dukes of Burgundy, 
who were after all French princes, followed the example of the French kings in the 
Netherlands, but it was mainly their sixteenth and early seventeenth Habsburg successors 
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who were responsible for the homologations.40 The process of homologation involved the 
central authorities and, thus, university trained lawyers. Consequently, it is not amazing that 
they used the occasion to insert Roman law in the official redaction of a customary law.41 In 
fact, romanization was stronger when centralisation was at work, as in those cases where 
local customs were replaced by a single provincial law.42 Roman law also gained ground 
because it had a supplementary role, plugging the gaps of customary law.43 In this, the model 
was the homologated custom of Burgundy.44 However, during the sixteenth century Roman 
law suffered an ‘authoritative degradation’,45 as it became ‘subsubsidiary’ instead of 
subsidiary. When there was a gap in the local law, jurists had to consult provincial custom, 
and only if the latter too did not resolve the issue, they could turn to Roman law.46 This 
proves that homologation only could bring Pyrrhic victories to Roman law. It expanded its 
influence, but it also strengthened and enshrined customary law47 so much that further 
impact became less likely. 
 Moreover, the Roman law of authors like Wielant, or of the homologated customs was 
not really the common law of Europe, but rather its local manifestation. Roman law was only 
used, if it conformed to local law, or at least did not contradict its principles. Given that 
Roman law meant those elements of Roman law which the local lawyers were willing to 
stomach, its meaning varied with the local circumstances.48 In general, there was a great 
willingness to assimilate, to apply the legal grammar of Roman law to local law, but not to 
transplant its institutions. Even if the latter took place, it happened, like in the late middle 
ages, very selectively. For example, from Roman law the lawyers from the Southern 
Netherlands did not take the principle that a person can freely dispose of his goods in a 
testament, but only the limitations of that principle, like the legitimate portion.49 Roman law 
was, in general, only welcome if it could strengthen indigenous law, not if it came to weaken 
it.  
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 This attitude towards Roman law was, strangely enough, also possible because the 
professors at Leuven University cared little for customary law.50 From the sixteenth century 
onwards the Habsburgs awarded a monopoly to Leuven law studies.51 At the provincial 
councils of justice even advocates needed to have a Leuven law degree, unless there were 
exceptional circumstances.52 This state of affairs, unfortunately, did not stimulate the Leuven 
professors to be very active or creative and it is even suggested that the great attachment of 
practitioners to local law may have been a reaction to the ‘unrealistic training’ they received 
at the university.53 This judgement may be too harsh, as the Leuven professors assimilated 
the advantages of humanism without giving up their interest in solving practical problems.54 
Thus, they mentally prepared future lawyers to assimilate , to treat their own law with the 
toolbox of Roman law, which also included writing it down in the homologations.55 
Nevertheless, even in the tribunal of the city of Antwerp, on which sat more university trained 
lawyers than on other local courts,56 the influence of Leuven remained limited.57 Another 
channel for this infiltration of the methodology, rather than the substance of Roman law, was 
the provincial councils of justice and the highest court of the land, the Great Council of 
Malines.58 Given the stagnation of customary law after homologation and the lethargy of the 
legislator, their importance cannot be overrated. 
 Much has been made of the differences between the successive schools of Roman 
law,59 yet, one should bear in mind that in the Southern Netherlands lawyers were first and 
foremost pragmatic and traditional.60 The school to which an author belonged was less 
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important than the availability and usefulness of his work.61 Even in the sixteenth century this 
meant that Bartolus and other late medieval authors dominated,62 because they served 
practice better, and better alternatives were not available, as it took some time for new 
authors to be circulated. French works later challenged the supremacy of Bartolus, but, once 
again, utility determined success.63 Thus, a greater scholar like Charles Du Moulin may be 
overshadowed by a lesser, though more useful author.64 In the eighteenth century legal 
authors may have had a preference for Dutch literature,65 but in the courtroom French 
authors remained important and their influence grew even stronger during the second half of 
the eighteenth century.66 Local authors were for a long time less popular,67 as there were 
fewer of them68 and their work had less chances of being printed.69 During the seventeenth 
century collections of (annotated) decisions of the highest courts70 gained in importance, with 
local case-law competing with French editions.71 Needless to say, local needs determined 
what material would be used. The aldermen of the great commercial port of Antwerp, for 
example, had many cases related to commerce and for them, even in the seventeenth 
century, Italy was a better guide than France.72 
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 France, the model for homologation and the selective reception of Roman law, was 
also the great source of inspiration for legislation. However, and most of all in the field of 
private law, statute law did not take on any real importance before the last decades of the 
eighteenth century73 and it was not very original. The great monument of legislation was the 
1611 Perpetual Edict, but with its 47 articles it is a meagre imitation of the great French 
ordinances.74 
 A counterpart to the French influence is the quasi absence of Spain75 and Austria,76 
the countries in which the princes of the Southern Netherlands lived from the mid sixteenth 
century. Their law was neglected, whereas France was the shining example. It was, of 
course, a neighbour; whereas Spain and Austria were far away, but crucially was that they 
had no willingness to impose their law upon the Southern Netherlands, which left its lawyers 
more or less free to follow their own inclinations. Customary law was so entrenched in the 
homologations that any other policy was likely to be unsuccessful anyway. In the eighteenth 
centuries the Austrians even stimulated the tendency to look to France, a less preordained 
event than is sometimes thought. The traditional story is that the French Dukes of Burgundy 
promoted French and that this continued under their successors. The historical reality was 
not so simple, as French also lost ground in the seventeenth century because Latin was the 
language for the man of letters, culture and law.77 Wielant wrote in Dutch (and French),78 
seventeenth century authors in Latin. Although French remained strong as the language of 
the central administration, the Austrians had no compelling reason for continuing to use it 
when they became the masters of the Southern Netherlands in 1713. However, whereas 
French was the language of a minority of the population, it was a language the elites of the 
Southern Netherlands and Austria shared. Vienna corresponded in French despite 
resistance in Dutch- (and German) - speaking territories.79  
 The choice for French may have been a good idea at the time, but in the end it 
proved to be fatal. Local tribunals in Dutch or German-speaking territories stuck to the 
regional law, but at the higher levels French was on the rise.80 From 1750 all written 
documents at the Great Council of Malines, the highest court in the land, were in French.81 
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Legal authors also switched to French82 and ignored literature in German. Consequently, the 
great German authors of the Enlightenment and their law, the Vernunftrecht, found few 
sympathizers in the Southern Netherlands. On the other hand, the new ideas had completely 
won over the Austrian emperor, Joseph II.83 In line with the Vernunftrecht which favoured a 
top down overhaul of the old law, he wanted to radically change the laws and institutions of 
the Southern Netherlands, but his complete break with the past could not have come in a 
place less suited for it. In 1789, the year of the French Revolution, the Southern Netherlands 
also had a Revolution, to preserve the Ancien Régime, not to destroy it. It was short lived, as 
already in 1790 the Austrians restored order at the price of their reforms.84 The experience 
proved that for an abrupt legal transplant to be successful, it had to be imposed more 
ruthlessly and take into account that French had become the language of law. 
 
B. Post 1795 law in Belgium 
 
1. The French Revolution and Napoleon: the wholesale and enduring transplant of French 
law 
 
 The French had both the right language and the force of arms to change the law of 
the Southern Netherlands overnight and they did so in 1795. France annexed the Southern 
Netherlands and at one swoop the French, in the so-called Code Merlin, abolished the many 
customs of the Southern Netherlands and imposed French law.85 Under Napoleon the 
Southern Netherlands were just a part of France and all the great Napoleonic codifications 
and reforms (judicial organisation (1800)), Civil Code (1804), Code of Civil Procedure (1806), 
Commercial Code (1807), Code of Criminal Procedure (1808), Penal Code (1810)) 
automatically came into force there. As such, this is not amazing, given that during the 
nineteenth century French law was transplanted all over the world. Belgium, however, is 
special in that it still is, to a large extent, enchained by French law, whereas almost all other 
countries have now broken free from it. In fact, Belgian may be even more faithful to its 
French heritage than France itself. Its judicial organisation is still closer to the Napoleonic 
model.86 In 2004, at the commemoration of two hundred years Civil Code, Belgium had 
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preserved more of the original articles than France.87 It still has the original Napoleonic Code 
of Criminal Procedure, which is no longer in force in France itself. In short, Belgium may well 
be Napoleon’s most faithful subject.88 
 An observer in 1830, when Belgium became independent, can be forgiven for thinking 
that the current situation was in his time the most unlikely turn of future events. Several 
strong arguments pleaded against a long life for the transplant of French law in Belgium: it 
had been imposed by a military occupation, the country had been united with the 
Netherlands for the last fifteen years and a new national fervour had caught the people’s 
imagination. It even became enshrined in the constitution which called for new codifications 
as soon as possible.89 Yet, the French judicial organisation, the French Civil Code and the 
Code of Criminal Procedure still stand. In other fields there are new Codes, but they do not 
really embody the will to break away from France. The 1867 Penal Code followed a French 
example90 and the 1967 Judicial Code slavishly stays within the French mould.91 The 
Commercial Code does not contradict the general pattern. Its structure remained intact 
during the nineteenth century, but its articles were replaced during the second half of the 
nineteenth century. Belgium then industrialised at break-neck speed (when World War I 
broke out, only the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany and France had an 
economy bigger than the one of tiny Belgium) and its ruling classes were well aware that it 
desperately needed new legislation to cope with the problems posed by industrialisation. 
Given that Belgium was ahead of France in developing its industry, it could not always follow 
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France and it had, this time, to develop its own rules and also look to other countries.92 
However, it is significant that Belgium only turned away from France, when it had no choice. 
Another example of this was the first major statute to amend the Civil Code in 1851.93 It dealt 
with real securities because this part of the Code showed many defects94 and it was only 
original because France’s economy had less need of an efficient regulation for this than 
Belgium’s. 
 
2. Explanations for the tenacity of the French legal transplant in Belgium 
 
 In studying the enduring success, as it may be called, of French law in Belgium, it is 
not very useful for this article to make a detailed study of the efforts undertaken to write new 
codifications. There is already an abundant literature about that subject95 and it makes clear 
that projects for a new code either did not want to get rid of the French heritage, or failed.96 In 
each case specific circumstances can explain the outcome to some extent, but this article, 
being a winner’s history of French law, should be more concerned with the reasons for 
French success, than with the explanations for individual failures to break away from France. 
 
a. The French legal transplant as the brutal successor of a gradual acculturation process 
 
 The 1795 legal transplant was shocking, because it was so abrupt and total. Yet, it 
also continued past practices. For centuries the laws of the Southern Netherlands had been 
guided by France. The process had now become more intense than ever before, but one 
should keep in mind that it had already become stronger during the second half of the 
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eighteenth century. Add to this the growing influence of the French language in general 
during the eighteenth century, and it is clear that the Southern Netherlands had been 
‘softened up’ for a French legal transplant. This explains, inter alia, why, during the 
unification with the Netherlands, the Belgians were less eager to write new codifications for 
the United Kingdom of the Netherlands than the Dutch.97 
 
b. French law, a well-known neighbour 
 
 If one looks not at the diversity of legal rules at the local level, but at the common 
elements they shared, the French legal transplant was, in most cases, less a reception of 
new rules than an assimilation of the old ones. After all, the ancient customs of the Southern 
Netherlands can be grouped together with those of Northern France, the so-called pays de 
droit coutumier. True, Napoleonic law formulated the existing legal rules in a new way, but it 
also gave them more clarity and visibility by abolishing their diversity and exceptions. For 
example, primogeniture was abolished, but this actually strengthened the underlying current 
of the old law, which had accepted primogeniture only as an exception to the general rule of 
equality amongst heirs.98 Another example is matrimonial property law. The 1804 Civil Code 
stated that the joint property of a married couple consisted of their moveables and their 
acquisitions, but most couples in the Southern Netherlands already married under this 
regime before 1795. Thus, in most cases the new rules fell into line with the general 
expectations, though there could be some local differences, which was also true in France 
itself.99 Hence, in the nineteenth century, Belgium nationalism could very well be reconciled 
with a French code, because the latter was based on Franco-Belgian customs.100 
 
c. The long French occupation and the perverse effect of the initial resistance to French law 
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 French law was close to the existing customs and its invasion had been prepared for 
centuries, but nevertheless there was some opposition.101 It would be wrong to see that as a 
manifestation of an anti-French spirit, since resistance was strongest in cases when the new 
rules went the most against existing traditions.102 Thus, what fuelled it was not the French 
origin of new rules, but their revolutionary character. Whether it was Joseph II or the French 
Revolution, a hated change led to protest and even that did not amount to much. A short-
lived peasants’ revolt of a few months in 1798103 and some unrest in the two years thereafter 
had no legal impact at all, because many people had also gained through the Revolution, 
e.g. by the abolition of feudalism. 
 Moreover, resistance was also possible by less visible means. Judges, notaries, 
lawyers and their clients tried to find ways to keep on using the old law. French law itself 
opened some venues for this approach. For example, art. 4 of the Civil Code made it a crime 
for a judge to refuse a judgement because the Code was obscure and inefficient and thus the 
judges sometimes had to turn to the old law to solve a dispute.104 Art. 2 of the Code stated 
that the latter was only to be applied in the future, as future effects of old situations were still 
being ruled by the old law. Contracts and wills also offered possibilities for staying with the 
old law.105 Régine Beauthier in a ground-breaking article has shown that the result of this 
resistance was a paradox: instead of being a bar to the success of the French Code, it 
actually enabled it,106 as it had a perverse effect. It mitigated the worst effects of the legal 
transplants, making it more acceptable for the population to get used to it. This was only 
possible because French law was given enough time to settle. The French remained in 
power for twenty years and thereafter it took the Dutch fifteen years to write, vote and 
prepare the application of new codifications.107 These should have come into force in 1831 
and, by then, Belgium had become independent. If the French had not stayed so long, or the 
Dutch had acted sooner, history might have been different. Thirty-five years of working with 
                                                          
101
  H. VAN GOETHEM, ‘La Belgique sous l’annexion à la France, 1795-1813: l’acceptation 
des nouvelles institutions judiciaires et du droit français’, in: S. Dauchy, J. Monballyu and A. 
Wijffels (ed.), Auctoritates. Xenia R.C. van Caenegem oblata, Brussels, Academy, 1997, 289-
301. 
102
  Cf. Godding, ‘Ancien droit’, 603-605. 
103
  L. François, De Boerenkrijg. Twee eeuwen feiten en fictie, Leuven, Davidsfonds, 1998. 
104
  D. Heirbaut, ‘Les juges belges face au Code civil’, in: B. Dölemeyer, H. Mohnhaupt 
and A. Somma (ed.), Richterliche Anwendung des Code civil in seinen europäischen 
Geltungsbereichen außerhalb Frankreichs, Frankfurt, Klostermann, 2006, 260-271. 
105
  F. Stevens, ‘Résistances et acculturations aux codes. Le code de 1804 et les actes de la 
pratique en Belgique’, in: Beauthier and Rorive, Code Napoléon, 207-215; R. Beauthier, ‘Le 
véritable sens de l’article 2 du Code civil. L’ambition du Code civil de remplacer l’ancien 
droit à la lumière de la jurisprudence belge de la première moitié du 19e siècle’, in: Beauthier 
and Rorive, Code Napoléon, 217-257. 
106
  Beauthier, ‘Article 2’, 257. 
107
  About these codes, see A. Wijffels, ‘Les contrats dans le Code civil de 1830. 
Contribution à l’histoire de la réception du Code civil des Français en Belgique sous le régime 
du Royaume des Pays-Bas’, in: P. Wéry (ed.), Le droit des obligations contractuelles et le 
bicentenaire du Code civil, Bruges, Die Keure, 2004, 21-59; A. Wijffels, ‘A phantom code: 
the 1830 Code of civil procedure for the kingdom of the Netherlands’, in: M. Faure, J. Smits 
and H. Schneider (ed.), Towards a European ius commune in legal education and research, 
Antwerp, Intersentia, 2002, 283-300; and the literature quoted there. 
French law meant that in 1830 only old lawyers had some faded memories of their old 
customs and even for them French law had become the ‘natural’ law of the land. In the first 
decades after independence French law had yet another argument working for it: it was 
cheap. Until 1852 Belgium did not protect the copy-right of French authors.108 Brussels 
publishers quickly saw they could offer a bargain to Belgian lawyers and still come out 
ahead.109 
 
d. Legal education 
 
 A shared history, laziness and greed all drove Belgian lawyers into the arms of 
French law. University education ensured that they would not try to escape from it. 
Eighteenth century legal education at Leuven had not been of the highest level110 and the 
French only made it worse. First they abolished law studies in Leuven and then they 
established only a vocational school.111 The United Kingdom of the Netherlands had a 
completely different philosophy. Judging, correctly, that the local lawyers were not that good, 
it established new universities and imported foreigners, Dutchmen and most of all 
Germans,112 to teach.113 The influence of this new policy is visible in La Thémis, a review 
which was very critical of French law.114 It was French, but there was a Belgian reprint and it 
published many contributions by Belgian professors or, rather, professors teaching in 
Belgium. La Thémis and its Belgian authors tried to promote the ideas of the German 
historical school in Belgium,115 but they made little headway and independence ended even 
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that. A few foreigners remained, but many others left.116 The standards were not very high for 
their replacements, as the constitution guaranteed freedom of education and anyone who 
wanted could teach law. To ensure that a university diploma in law would be worth 
something, the government gave the monopoly on awarding law degrees to a central 
commission in Brussels.117 The commission did not appreciate original thinkers and let those 
who slavishly followed French handbooks pass. 
 In 1876 a reform of higher education made it possible for universities to confer law 
degrees themselves118 and new ways of teaching became possible. By then, Belgian lawyers 
had become so used to French law that it took them some time to become aware of their 
new freedom. Until the 1950’s it was still possible to use French handbooks of private law.119 
Even today, the focus of law teaching is still mostly on statute law or case-law, which in many 
cases means French law or its interpretation, as the legislative diarrhoea does not leave 
much time for critical scholarly work. Nevertheless, the situation is much better than in the 
nineteenth century, when many of the leading lawyers were foreigners. François Laurent, 
Belgium’s greatest lawyer ever, was a native of Luxemburg and had to be naturalised.120 The 
authors of the 1867 Penal Code were, originally, a Dutchman and a German.121 
 
d. The inactivity of the Justice department 
 
 A crucial element for the survival of French law is that Belgian ministers of Justice 
have not been very active.122 The great reform of commercial law was a collective effort of all 
Belgian politicians123 and would also have taken place without ministers of justice. Ministers 
shelved projects of new codes or did not defend them in parliament.124 Enthusiasm for new 
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projects was, at best, lukewarm.125 In doing so, the minister fulfilled expectations: he had to 
be a caretaker who did not rock the boat.126 Even if a new text could be written, it had to shy 
away from great innovations.127 This has changed somewhat in the last two decades. 
Parliament approved two new codes and the current minister (2009) even proposes a 
complete reorganisation of the judicial system.128 As to the latter, the future is very uncertain, 
whereas for the former ambitions have been limited. The new codes are so-called mini-
codes, they deal with a relatively small part of law (international private law (2004) or 
companies (1999)) and most of the time they confirm existing practices.129 A new major Code 
of economic law is in preparation,130 but it is written at the behest of the department of 
economics. The lethargy of the lawmaker has, at times, given to French institutions a much 
longer lease of life than was warranted by the needs of daily life. For example, in 1804 the 
French introduced the family council as a mechanism for controlling the guardian of a minor. 
Despite this institution’s lack of success,131 it was only abolished in 2001.132 
 
f. A lack of respect for French law 
 
 One of the paradoxes of French law in Belgium is that it still lives, because the 
veneration of the Belgians does not stop them from making a mess of their French 
inheritance. The Commercial Code still has the Napoleonic structure, but all the original 
articles were thrown out in the second half of the nineteenth century, the four articles on 
commercial courts surviving until 1967. The Civil Code offers the best view of the strange 
adherence of Belgium to its French law. One half is still original while the other has been 
mutilated in any possible way imaginable. Even if one is willing to disregard the content, the 
form of the new changes is bewildering enough. New articles are not numbered in a uniform 
way. The fancy of the moment determines whether it is 577-2, 331quinquies, 213 a, or even 
488bis, j. The legislator sometimes abrogated articles of the code in order to replace them 
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with a new text with its own numbering, so that, for example, in between article 2091 and 
article 2119, one finds articles numbered 1 to 144. In some cases in which the legislator did 
not insert the new text in the code, he changed his mind a century later.133 Thus, reading the 
Belgian version of the French Civil Code it is easy to see that Belgium has not shown much 
respect to its most successful immigrant. However, once again, there is a paradox. Belgium’s 
irreverence towards French law and its willingness to constantly adapt it to new situations 
has ensured that it remains living law until the present day. 
  
f. The pragmatism of the practitioners: the invisible hand 
 
 All of the above can, with some exaggeration, be reduced to one common cause: the 
dominance of the law practitioner in Belgium. It is hard to find great legislators in Belgium, its 
past (though not its present) does not reveal many great law professors. Judges, advocates, 
proctors, notaries and the like are the leading personalities of Belgian law. They were the 
ones who had become impregnated by French law and culture before 1795, who had 
become accustomed to French law in 1830, who preferred cheaper French books in the 
decades thereafter, who did not like unpractical academics and active ministers of justice. 
Their attitude is most of all pragmatic, which means that legal literature has to serve practical 
needs. Successful law reviews in Belgium reflect this. Experiments have been undertaken, 
but if the law review is not an instrument of legal practice, its impact will be limited. For 
example, the Tijdschrift voor privaatrecht, the greatest promoter of legal scholarship in 
Belgium outside the universities, owes it popularity less to its high academic standards than 
to its very useful surveys of leading cases.134 
 The dominance of the law practitioner means that in evaluating the French legal 
transplant one should not focus on statutory law only. Its application in practice should also 
be taken into account, as it may very well happen that Belgium and France are divided by a 
common rule. In those cases a text may be French, but its interpretation is Belgian.135 A 
detailed study is still needed to determine whether some of these differences go back to pre 
1795 law, or are just a consequence of the French court of cassation not being competent for 
Belgium. 
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  The pragmatism of the law practitioner also explains the conservatism of Belgian law. 
Its general attitude can be summarised as: ‘If it ain’t broken, don’t fix it. If it is, change as little 
as possible.’ One of the best examples of this attitude, and its unfortunate consequences, 
can be found in the law of civil procedure. Every reform wants to make procedures faster and 
cheaper and still guarantee the parties’ rights. Napoleon tried to do so in 1806 and failed and 
this has also been the fate of all his successors in Belgium. A nineteenth century project for a 
new Civil Code by Albéric Allard would have achieved the goal of an efficient procedure, but 
the proctors lobbied so successfully against it, that parliament only approved its preliminary 
title. Almost a century later, in 1967, parliament voted a Judicial Code (the proctors remained 
silent this time, they had been bought off). Ten years later a leading specialist of procedural 
law already called it a failure. One of the two framers blamed this on the practitioners, but 
success had been impossible from the start, as the new code still stuck to the principle of 
party autonomy, or more exactly, advocates’ autonomy. The main author of the Code, 
himself an advocate extolling the virtues of the bar, had even deliberately neglected the best 
model for an efficient procedure at that time (Austria’s 1898 Zivilprozessordnung), because it, 
rightly, gave more powers to the judge. A 1992 Judiciary Code Amendment Act failed and 
the effect of the 2007 Judicial Code Modification Act to Combat Judicial Delay is still in doubt, 
once again in the interests of practitioners, this time the judges seem to be more important 
than an efficient procedure.136 
 
3. The current situation: begging for European intervention 
 
 The French influence is still strong in Belgium, but it is no longer what it used to be. 
For this several reasons can be given. Already mentioned are the changes in legal education 
which made it possible to look to other countries than France and which has led to the great 
importance of comparative law in Belgium. A second factor is the social and economic 
change, which already played a role in the second half of the nineteenth century, as the 
history of commercial law shows. Even more important is the linguistic change. In the 
nineteenth century, it didn’t matter that a majority of the population spoke Dutch, because all 
the lawyers spoke French. A long process of emancipation, starting in 1856, led to a first 
change in legislation in 1873 and from 1898 the Dutch text of a statute, royal decree or 
government regulation is as authentic as the French one. Since 1935 judicial proceedings 
have to respect the language of the region in which the court is located; this means that in 
Flanders the judges have to use Dutch. Law teaching in Dutch had become possible at 
Ghent University, later followed by others, in 1923. In the 1930s legal scholarship in Dutch 
equalled the quality of the French publications and since the 1980s the output in Dutch 
largely surpasses that in French. The result is that Belgium still shares one federal law, but 
that there are differences between Dutch and French-speaking Belgian lawyers. One of 
these is that a Flemish law professor is more likely to consult Dutch literature, whereas his 
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French-speaking colleague will have a preference for French jurisprudence. Needless to say, 
this is a simplifying generalisation which does not hold true in every single case. For example 
the co-operation of the Liège law faculty with its colleagues from Maastricht in the 
Netherlands proves that the actual situation is more complicated than sketched here. Still, it 
is remarkable that Dutch has become the second model for Belgian law, together with 
French law. A distant third is German law, but in many cases its influence is only indirect, 
through either France or the Netherlands. Fourth is Anglo-American law, due to globalisation 
and the presence of international law firms in Brussels. Another effect of globalisation is the 
influence of immigrants and their ideas about what the law should be.137 
 Given the ongoing processes of globalisation and European unification, the growing 
rift between lawyers on both sides of Belgium’s linguistic border is somewhat ironic. From 
1970 subsequent revisions of the constitution have changed Belgium from unitary into a 
federal state. Regions and communities make legislation for their areas of competence, but a 
major part of law, including private law, is still federal and Dutch and French-speaking 
Belgians still need to find compromises, which their growing differences make harder to find. 
Consequently, Europeanization, seen, at best, as a mixed blessing in many other member 
states of the Union, is welcomed because it offers a way out of this deadlock. In fact, since 
the 1960’s Europe has become an excuse for inaction. Why bother to make Belgian law, if 
that is so hard to achieve and Europe will take care of the problem anyway? The wisdom of 
waiting for the next European transplant remains to be seen, but there is no denying that this 
approach fits well with the historical constant of Belgian law, the pragmatism of the 
practitioner, to whom it is more sensible to copy others than to invent something oneself. 
 
II. Specific institutions or legal mechanisms 
 
A. Historical perspective 
 
On the question about institutions or legal mechanisms that have been received by 
Belgium, one can globally say that there are two periods of reception:  
a) Belgium, as a part of the Roman Empire, has of course been ruled by Roman law in 
Roman times. The Belgian territories were conquered by Caesar’s armies during the Gallic 
Wars (58-50 B.C.). Of course, this did not mean that since then only Roman law had been in 
force on these territories. On the contrary, Roman law was applied on a personal basis, thus 
only to Roman citizens. But with time, more and more “Belgians” became Roman citizens 
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and this is how Roman law spread all over the Belgian territories.138 This period of Roman 
Belgium ended with the end of the Western Roman Empire and the migrations of the end of 
the fifth century A.D. For the Belgian territories, the migrations meant the arrival of the 
Franks and the departure of many Romanized citizens, who headed south. Law being still 
applied on a personal basis, Roman law basically left Belgium with the Romanized people of 
northern Gaul.  
b) The second period of reception was the period that started with the Frankish Kingdom. For 
the Belgian territories, it meant a blend of influences, but mainly the influence of French law. 
This part of the story has already been dealt with above (A. Pre 1795 law in the Southern 
Netherlands). 
The outcome of both receptions was probably very important, even if we still have to 
distinguish between them: 
a) As for the first one, we know only very little about Celtic law in the Belgian territories, so it 
is almost impossible to tell what the law was like, during pre-Roman times. It is also quite 
difficult to say what the relative importance of Roman law and Celtic law has been. 
b) About the later reception, the outcome of French influence on Belgian law is massive. 
Basically, Belgian law is French law, even if the recent evolution of Belgium tends to be 
influenced also by Dutch, German and American law (see above: B.3. The current situation: 
begging for European intervention). 
 
B. The driving forces of the legal receptions 
 
Both receptions were the result of a military conquest, but there have been important 
differences between both movements: 
a) During Antiquity - but also later - law was enforced on a personal way. This means that 
Roman law was applicable only to Roman citizens, not to the inhabitants of Belgium. This 
means that for the Roman military conquest, the legal reception was not a corollary of the 
conquest itself. Roman law was a privilege, but in 212 A.D. it was extended to all inhabitants 
of the Roman Empire who all became Roman citizens.139 So this is how Roman law also 
became – de facto and by way of consequence – applicable almost to the whole territory. 
b) In contrast to the reception of Roman law, the reception of French law was an immediate 
result of the French military conquest, when the Southern Netherlands were annexed by 
France (as reminded above: B.1. The French Revolution and Napoleon: the wholesale and 
enduring transplant of French law). 
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 C. Roman and French law receptions as wholesales 
 
As the receptions of Roman and French law were both wholesales, it is useless to try 
to identify received institutions or received legal mechanisms. The topic becomes more 
interesting only when we consider the more recent evolution of Belgian law and if we have a 
look at the more recent Dutch and German influences.140 These influences seem to have 
reached Belgian law mostly through doctrinal mechanisms. 
 
D. The case of the rechtsverwerking141  
 
New foreign legal institutions could be received in Belgian law either by way of 
legislation, or by the courts. It does not seem that the Belgian legislator used them very much 
in civil law. Actually, most changes of Belgian Civil Code142 have been done in the first book 
(Law of Persons), but these changes say more about the evolution of Belgian society, than 
about Belgian civil law. The hard core of the Code has not really been changed by the 
legislator. 
The recognition of new legal theories has to be looked for in the decisions of the 
Belgian court of cassation. It is interesting to see how this Supreme Court dealt with the legal 
institution of Verwirkung, in Belgium usually called rechtsverwerking after its Dutch name. 
The Verwirkung-rule says that a right will be forfeited if the owner of the right fails to use it for 
a longer period of time, so that the debtor could have the impression that he would not have 
to fulfill his obligation anymore. This rule was unknown in Belgian law until 1979, when it 
became the subject of a comparative study of the Vereniging voor vergelijking van het recht 
in België en Nederland,143 the society for comparison of law in Belgium and the Netherlands. 
Originally, it was a general clause, developed by German jurisprudence and thus, it was 
already a legal transplant in Dutch law. 
 
E. Psychological Approach. The reception was conscious or unconscious? Confessed or 
denied? 
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The discussion on introducing the legal transplant Verwirkung/Rechtsverwerking also 
in Belgian law has been quite tough.144 It was, of course, a very sensitive question, as it 
would have given much more power to the judges, and this was not the tendency of the 
French legal tradition (see above B.2.g. The pragmatism of the practitioners: the invisible 
hand). Indeed, it was left to the judge to decide whether the owner had waited for too long or 
not. This legal transplant has had some success amongst Flemish, but also amongst French 
speaking judges. The Belgian court of cassation has first seemed to admit the validity of this 
legal transplant,145 but finally decided to reject it,146 sticking to a strict conformity to the Civil 
Code. 
As a member of the European Union, Belgium has of course transposed several 
European guidelines in Belgian law. Generally, one can say that Belgium is rather slow in 
fulfilling its international duties. It is also rather uninspired in doing so. If, for example, one 
looks at the directive on certain aspects of the sale of consumer goods,147 Belgium has 
basically drafted only the text of the directive itself,148 whereas in Germany the same 
directive has been used to make a major revision of the BGB.149 Compared to France now, it 
is funny to notice that the transposition of this directive created a difference between French 
and Belgian law, whereas earlier both still had exactly the same text, the one drafted in 1804. 
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III. Conclusions 
 
Concluding, one could wonder whether Belgian law really exists. Somehow, the 
attempts to go our own way have been shallow. Since the codification of private law, Belgian 
law has been French and little has changed. Of course, there is a growing rift between 
lawyers on both sides of Belgium’s linguistic border, but this rift has only made it more 
difficult to reach the necessary compromises to change Belgian law. As has been stated 
above, the recent process of Europeanization of private law is seen to offer a way out of the 
deadlock. The efforts needed to reach compromises between French-speaking and Dutch-
speaking lawyers are considered to have become useless, as European law will wash away 
most of it anyway. However, this remains to be proven. Not all legal systems of Europe are 
impatient to have their own law replaced by European law and there might still be a good 
perspective for Belgian law in the future. In some way, however, this rather passive approach 
fits well with the historical constant of Belgian law, the pragmatism of the practitioner, to 
whom it is more sensible to copy others than to invent something himself. 
 
 
 
